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Case No. 20150605-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

MICHAEL JOHN EDGAR,

Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for six counts of possession with
intent to distribute, a first degree felony; three counts of possession with
intent to distribute, a second degree felony; one count of theft by receiving
stolen property, a third degree felony; and one count of possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2015).

INTRODUCTION
Defendant was convicted for

receiving stolen property

and

committing various drug crimes including possession with intent to
distribute myriad illicit drugs, but he challenges only the admissibility of
evidence supporting his drug-related convictions. Defendant argues that
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the trial court erred in overruling an alleged prejudice objection to evidence
that he contacted the DEA and offered to help agents gain access to a highlevel heroin trafficker in exchange for leniency in this case. Alternatively,
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for not raising a prejudice
objection to the evidence. Defendant further argues that trial counsel was
ineffective for not objecting to an amendment to the information that
substituted a sports facility for a ballet school as the facility that triggered
the drug-free-zone penalty enhancement. Defendant has not shown that his
prejudice objection was preserved below; nor has he met his heavy burden
to show deficient performance and prejudice with regard to either of his
ineffectiveness clahns.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Defendant was arrested for trying to sell a stolen trailer. At the
time of his arrest, he was in sole possession of a briefcase filled with myriad,
distributable amounts of illicit drugs including heroin, paraphernalia, two
valid prescription bottles containing Oxycodone bearing his name, and
identification documents belonging to people not involved in the case.
After he was charged, Defendant contacted the DEA and offered to
help agents gain access to a high-level heroin dealer in exchange for
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reduced charges. There is no evidence that Defendant ever discussed his
request for leniency with the prosecuting attorney.
(a). Did the trial court err in overruling an alleged objection under
rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, to a DEA agent's testimony that
Defendant offered to help the DEA gain access to a high-level heroin
trafficker in exchange for reduced charges?

Standard of Review. This issue is unpreserved; no standard of review
applies.
(b). Alternatively, was trial counsel ineffective because he did not
raise a rule 403 objection to evidence of Defendant's offer to help the DEA?

Standard of Review. An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim raised
for the first time on appeal presents a question of law. State v. Bedell, 2014
UT 1, ,120, 322 P.3d 697.
2. The morning of trial, the prosecutor filed an amended information
that substituted a sports facility for a ballet school previously identified as
the facility that h·iggered the drug-free-zone penalty enhancement. The trial
court allowed the amendment on the ground that the prosecutor would call
an owner of the sports facility to testify, as per trial counsel's request.
Counsel investigated the sports facility online and both the prosecutor and
counsel interviewed the owner during a break before the owner testified.
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Was h·ial counsel ineffective for not objecting to the amendment?

Standard of Review. See l.(b)., above.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendum A: U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary off acts. 1

Following Defendant's arrest for trying to sell a stolen trailer, he was
found in possession of myriad illicit pills and other drugs (including
heroin), digital scales, packaging materials, paraphernalia, two valid
prescription bottles containing Oxycodone bearing his name, and several
identifications belonging to other people. See R444-R448; State's Exhibit (SE)
13,13A,19,19A (SE7-29 are attached in Addendum B).
* * *

Defendant was arrested near where he was trying to sell a stolen
trailer on Geneva Road, in Lindon, Utah. See R384. Defendant told one of
two officers from the Lindon City Police Department, Officer Boren, that he
was selling the trailer for someone who owed him money, but whose name
1

Defendant does not contest his conviction for receiving stolen
property; the State thus limits its summary of facts to those relevant to
Defendant's drug convictions.

-4-
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he did not know. R378,R381-382,R478. 2 Defendant also denied knowing
who owned the Cadillac he was driving at the time, claiming that he had
borrowed it from a friend of a friend. R460-461. Boren was ultimately able
to confirm that Defendant in fact had the owner's permission to drive the
Cadillac.

Id.

Boren also obtained the bill of sale for the trailer from

Defendant. R461;SE5. It listed two names, Joshua Haskill and Robin Smith.
SES. Boren h ied unsuccessfully to follow up on both names. R462,R478.
4

Defendant told Boren that he did not know Haskill. R478.
Officer Boren had already left for the jail with Defendant when, in the
course of an inventory search, Detective Purvis found a briefcase in the
trunk of the Cadillac. See R463. The briefcase contained myriad illicit pills
and other drugs (including methamphetamine, heroin, and LSD), digital
scales, paraphernalia (including spoons, pipes, syringes, wrapping papers),
and packaging material.

R383-387,R434-451;SE7-29.

Although the illicit

pills and other drugs in the briefcase were packaged in single-user amounts,
in Purvis' s twenty-one years of experience, the totality of the briefcase's
contents supported that the drugs were intended for distribution: "[I]t's all
packaged together and massive amounts of different kinds of pills. That's
2

Before trial, Boren killed himself and several family 1nembers in a
murder-suicide. See R462.

-5- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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common with people distributing medications to other people." R474; see

also R386-R387 ("That's typical of what dealers use to sell their product.
They package it in smaller packages, use scales to weigh out the large
quantities to put in the smaller packages."); R455 (" [I]ts a large distributable
amount of stuff.").
The briefcase also contained two valid prescriptions for Oxycodone in
Defendant's

name,

see

R438,R443-444;SE13-13A&SE19-19A,

a

wallet

belonging to Joshua Haskill, and several identifications belonging to other
people, see R466-67.

Both Officer Boren and Detective Purvis tried

unsuccessfully to make contact with Haskill and the other people whose
identifications were found in the briefcase.

See R466-67,R471,R478-479.

According to Purvis, most of the individuals were "into drugs" and their
families no longer had contact with them or knew where to locate them.
R467; see also R479 ("[T]heir families lost touch with them. They said they
were on drugs, they didn't know what they were doing, they didn't have
any way to contact them themselves."). Haskill, however, later contacted
law enforcement about his missing driver's license. See R480-481.
B.

Summary of proceedings.

Defendant was charged with theft by receiving stolen property worth
over $5000, a second degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (West 2004);

-6-
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six counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute in
a drug-free zone, a first degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-S(l}(a)(iii),
(4) (West Supp. 2015-2016); three counts of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute in a drug-free zone, a second degree
felony, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-S(l)(a)(iii), (4) (West Supp. 2015-2016); and
possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A
misdemeanor, Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37a-5(1) (West 2012) (R27-30).
1. Defendant contacts the DEA and offers to help agents
gain access to a high-level heroin trafficker in exchange
for leniency.

After he was charged, Defendant contacted a DEA agent, Brandon
II

Holmer, via the "duty phone." R412-413, R418. The duty phone" is an
11

after hours," "publically available number" that anyone may use to report

"drug trafficking activities." R412-413. Defendant told Agent Holmer that
he would introduce him to a high-level-heroin trafficker in Salt Lake City in
exchange for "consideration with his pending charges in Utah County."
R419.
2. The trial court overrules a relevance objection to evidence
of Defendant's offer. 3

At trial, Defendant objected on relevance grounds to Agent Holmer
testifying about his offer to help the DEA. R414. Outside the presence of
3

Pertinent h·anscript pages (R414-432) are attached in Addendum C.
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the jury, counsel elaborated that Holmer's testimony was not relevant
because Defendant called the DEA several months after the charged crimes
occurred. R415; see also R412-R413. Continuing outside the presence of the
jury, the prosecutor elicited Holmer's proffer that Defendant said he
contacted the DEA because "[h]e was seeking consideration with pending
charges [at the state level] by cooperating with law enforcement on other
cases." R415-R416. Defendant believed that Holmer "could supercede the
authority of the state and compel them to help him out with his charges."
R416. Defendant thus asked Holmer to contact the Utah County prosecutor,
Craig Johnson, and ask about a "stay" or "reduction in his charges." Id. In
exchange, Defendant said "he had access to a high level Mexican heroin
trafficker that operated out of Salt Lake City." R417. Defendant said the
heroin trafficker dealt in

11

[p ]ound level quantities," which in Holmer' s

II

experience was a fairly good sized trafficker." Id.
After hearing Holmer' s proffer, the trial court overruled defense
counsel's relevance objection: "the basis of the conversation and the
projection as it relates to the usefulness of the information that could be
provided and that it related specifically to this pending, these pending
charges because there's a reference directly to Mr. Craig Johnson as Deputy
Utah County Attorney and I will find by virtue of that and the admissions

-8-
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involved that it is relevant."

R418.

The trial court further noted that

Defendant's statement was "sort of an admission against interest. I would
make the further observation that there's been testimony already that some
of the drugs involved were heroin; and secondarily, the independent
contact by the defendant with a federal agent was initiated by him and that
secondarily that it would be admissions against interest." Id.
3. The trial court excludes evidence of Defendant's similar
offer in another case on prejudice grounds.

When Agent Holmer resumed testifying in front of the jury he
reiterated his earlier proffer to the trial court-i.e., that Defendant contacted
him and offered to help the DEA gain access to a high-level heroin trafficker
"in exchange for consideration with his pending charges in Utah County."
R419. Holmer additionally testified that Defendant "identified Mr. Johnson
as the prosecutor over his cases," and that they discussed "what services"
Defendant "could provide." Id. Concerned that Holmer had referenced
Defendant's "other pending cases," the trial court called another bench
conference. Id.
Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court observed that
referring to "multiple charges" could be "potentially approaching
prejudicial if he (Agent Holmer) goes into each of the cases and the number
of charges and the nature of the charges and everything else." Id. The trial

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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court thus asked the prosecutor to "advise" Holmer "that beyond what he
has testified to or he heard from him that he can't open the door to all the
other cases that are pending and everything else that way." R420.
Following the bench conference, the prosecutor elicited more detail
about Defendant's offer to the DEA, including that Defendant said the highlevel-heroin trafficker "was capable of dealing in pounds of heroin, which,
for the record, was worth [Agent Holmer's] time" because the street value
of that amount of heroin was between $10,000 and $20,000. R423.

The

prosecutor also elicited that when working with a potential confidential
informant, Holmer "[h·ied] to find out if they are currently or have
previously worked with anyone else in law enforcement."

R424.

This

statement prompted defense counsel to request a bench conference. R424R425.
At the bench, the trial court reiterated that Agent Holmer could not
"talk about [Defendant's] past at all[.] He can talk about this case but he
can't talk about the fact that he's served as a confidential informant in the
past in any form or fashion. That's out totally, in my estimation." R425.
After the prosecutor said he had planned to call another DEA agent to
testify about Defendant's similar offer in another case, the trial court

-10-
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excused the jury so that it could make a determination as to the "breadth of
the direct examination" of Holmer. R425-R426; see also R428.
After the jury was excused, defense counsel argued that Agent
Holmer's testimony "could easily lead to mistrial," where Holmer had
already testified about Defendant's "other cases," and about Defendant's
"working with other state agents that won't be involved in this case, ... and
other matters that happened well after November 7, 2013." R427.

The

prosecutor responded that evidence Defendant had previously worl.<ed with
another agent was admissible and he should thus be allowed to explore it.

See R427-R429.

Defense counsel objected that evidence of Defendant's

"other cases," and that Defendant worked "with other officers ... that don't
pertain necessarily to this case," was "prejudicial." R429.
The trial court reiterated that evidence Defendant contacted and
made an offer to Agent Holmer was admissible. R430. But the trial court
excluded evidence that Defendant contacted another DEA agent in another
case: "[W]e have to be very cautionary in my estimation as it relates to the
next case." R430; see also R431. The trial court observed that the prosecutor
"probably [had] enough before the jury already relative to that independent
contact by this defendant relative to the resolution of this case with a
designation that he is able to supply them with high level h·affickers." R430.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law-11Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Given the trial court's observation, the prosecutor agreed to "wrap it up,"
and to not call the other DEA agent. R431. When Agent Holmer resumed
testifying, the prosecutor elicited only that Holmer ultimately told
Defendant he was not willing to work with him. R432.
4. The information is amended to substitute a sports facility
for a ballet school as the facility that triggered the drugfree-zone penalty enhancement.

The morning of trial, the prosecutor moved to amend

the

information-Le., to substitute "Ultimate Sports USA Baseball and Softball
Training" for a ballet school previously identified as the facility that
triggered a drug-free-zone penalty enhancement.

See R169-172; see also

R808-813 (attached in Addendum D). The prosecutor planned to call the
"case officer to testify about the Ultimate Sports training facility, since he
had measured its distance from the defendant's arrest, but the defense
attorney objected, arguing that the officer's testimony lacked foundation."
R810. Accordingly, the h·ial court ruled that the prosecutor could file the
amended information only if he "called the owner or opera tor of the
Ultimate Sports training facility to establish the foundation for the new
drug-free zone." Id.

-12-
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During h·ial, the prosecutor elicited uncontroverted testimony from
Detective Purvis that the sports facility was within 400-420 feet from where
Defendant was arrested. R455.
The prosecutor also "located one of the owners of one of the
businesses located [within] the Ultimate Sports training facility ... and she
II

agreed to appear at trial later that day." R810. Defense counsel did some
Google research on the training facility briefly that morning." R810-R811.
II

Both the prosecutor and counsel interviewed the owner during a break in
the trial proceedings" that same morning. R811. On direct examination, the
prosecutor elicited the owner's testimony that during the peak months of
November through May, there were roughly 200 to 300 people under age
eighteen at the facility on a weekly basis. R394. On cross examination, trial
counsel elicited that the owner's business required a membership to
participate, that a security code was required to access the building if no one
else was there, and that participating clients had to sign a waiver. R399R402.
5. Defense theory: Defendant did not possess the drugs in
the briefcase, but even if he did, they were intended for
personal use, not distribution.

In closing argument, defense counsel argued, among other things,
that the State had not proven that Defendant possessed the drugs in the
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briefcase where (1) Defendant was driving someone else's car; (2) the
briefcase was found in the trunk after Defendant was taken from the scene;
(3) Defendant never admitted the briefcase was his; and, (4) although
Defendant had property inside the briefcase, it also contained other peoples'
property.

R572-R574.

Defense counsel further argued that even if

Defend ant did possess the drugs in the briefcase, they were packaged in
individual user amounts, which was more consistent with personal use than
with distribution. R574-R575. Turning to the drug-free-zone evidence,
defense counsel argued that the Ultimate Sports building was not
necessarily open to the public. R576-R578. Rather, it was more akin to a
private gym that required a membership for admission. Id.
On rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that the Ultimate Sports facility
hosted from fifty to two hundred children per week from November
through May; moreover, the mere fact that it could not be accessed after
hours without a membership did not mean it was not a sports facility.
R584-585. As for the drug charges, the prosecutor pointed out that other
than the two prescription bottles bearing Defendant's name found inside
the briefcase, none of the other drugs in the briefcase had peoples' names on
them. R591. Additionally, Defendant never told the officers the names of
the alleged friends from whom he obtained either the stolen trailer or the

-14-
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Cadillac. R591-592. Defendant had been the Cadillac's sole occupant and
driver. Id. Added to that, the briefcase in the trunk contained myriad pills
and other illicit drugs packaged for distribution, scales for weighing drugs,
and additional baggies.

R592.

Although the briefcase also contained

paraphernalia that could be used to ingest or inhale some of the drugs, that
did not mean the multitude of drugs in the briefcase were intended only for
Defendant's personal use. Id. To the contrary, the drugs were packaged for
distribution: "[I]t's a mobile pharmacy. But he's not a pharmacist, ladies
and gentleman, he's a drug dealer." R593.

Finally, the prosecutor argued

that Agent Holmer' s testimony about Defendant's offer to help the DEA
gain access to a high-level heroin trafficker in exchange for reduced charges
in this case showed Defendant's "consciousness of guilt" for the charged
crimes. Td.
The jury convicted Defendant as charged. R178-R188. The trial court
imposed statu~ory prison terms of five-years-to-life for each of the six first
degree felony convictions; one-to-fifteen year prison terms for each of the
three second degree felony convictions; and a zero-to-five year term for the
third degree felony conviction. R236-R239. The trial court ordered that the
prison terms run concurrent with each other and with Defendant's
sentences in other cases. R238;R732. The h ial court sentenced Defendant to
4
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257 days jail with credit for time served for the class A misdemeanor. R238.
The court also "suspended all fines and fees," and recommended that
Defendant participate in the Conquest Program in prison, and that he
"serve the least amount of time possible after getting his treatment in terms
of drug rehab." R732-33. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R240.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.(a). Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
overruling an alleged rule 403 objection to evidence that he offered to help
the DEA gain access to a high-level heroin trafficker in exchange for
leniency.

But Defendant did not preserve a rule 403 objection to this

evidence; he raised only a relevance objection. The trial court overruled
Defendant's relevance objection and Defendant has abandoned that claim
on appeal. Because Defendant's argument regarding an alleged rule 403
objection is unpreserved, this Court will address it only if Defendant can
establish plain error, ineffective assistance of counsel, or exceptional
circumstances.
I.(b). Defendant alternatively argues that his counsel was ineffective
for not raising a rule 403 objection to the offer evidence. But Defendant has
not rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel reasonably chose to
forgo a rule 403 objection because he reasonably concluded that rule 403
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would not have excluded it.

That rule creates a high bar to excluding

relevant evidence. It applies only when the evidence's probative value is
substantially outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice.
Counsel could have reasonably concluded

that evidence

of

Defendant's offer to help the DEA had high probative value because it went
to the central issue of the case- i.e., whether Defendant knowingly
possessed the drugs in the briefcase, and if so, whether he intended to
distribute them. Counsel argued that the drugs in the briefcase did not
belong to Defendant, but that even if they did, he did not intend to
distribute them.

Defendant's offer to help the DEA get access to a high-

level heroin trafficker in exchange for reduced charges was therefore highly
relevant and probative of Defendant's knowledge and intent.
Counsel also could have reasonably concluded that the h·ial court
would view Defendant's offer to help the DEA as highly probative because
the offer arguably constituted a tacit admission of Defendant's guilt.
Defendant's request for leniency arguably showed that he believed that the
drug charges against him were valid. The evidence also had a low potential
for unfair prejudice because Defendant's offer to help the DEA was tied to
his request for leniency in this case, therefore reducing the chance that the
jury would consider the testimony only as evidence that Defendant knew
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drug dealers. Given all this, counsel could have reasonably decided that a
rule 403 objection would be futile.
Finally, Defendant cannot show prejudice because a rule 403 objection
would have in fact been futile and the remaining evidence against him was
overwhelming. Defendant was found in sole custody of a briefcase that
contained multiple, distributable amounts of drugs, including heroin and
two prescriptions for Oxycodone in Defendant's name. While the briefcase
also contained several other people's identifications, none of those people's
names were on any of the drugs in the briefcase.
II. Defendant next argues that his counsel was ineffective because he

did not object to a last-minute amendment to the information that
substituted a sports facility for a ballet school as the entity that triggered the
drug-free-zone penalty enhancement. Given the timing of the amendment,
Defendant argues that his counsel could not measure the distance between
the sports facility and the location of Defendant's arrest, and also could not
otherwise investigate the sports facility.

These claims fail at the outset

because they are unsupported in the record. The unconh·overted evidence
established that the sports facility was well within the statutorily required
distance fro1n where Defendant was arrested in possession of the drugs. It
is further uncontroverted that trial counsel researched the sports facility
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online that morning, and that he also interviewed an owner before she
testified.

No record evidence proves- or even suggests - that any

additional research could have established that the sports facility was more
than 1000 feet from the location of Defendant's arrest, or that it did not
otherwise qualify to trigger the drug-free-zone penalty enhancement.
Moreover, Defendant has not sought a remand to develop any nonspeculative evidence supporting his claim of ineffectiveness.

ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN OVERRULING AN
ALLEGED RULE 403 OBJECTION TO EVIDENCE THAT
DEFENDANT OFFERED TO HELP THE DEA GAIN
ACCESS TO A HIGH-LEVEL HEROIN TRAFFICKER IN
EXCHANGE
FOR
LENIENCY;
ALTERNATIVELY,
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS COUNSEL
WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE HE DID NOT OBJECT
UNDER RULE 403

In Point I of his brief, Defendant argues that the trial court erred
when it overruled an alleged rule 403 objection to Agent Holmer's
testimony that Defendant offered to help the DEA gain access to a highlevel heroin trafficker in exchange for reduced charges. Aplt.Br.9-15 (citing
Utah R. Evid. 403). Alternatively, Defendant argues that his counsel was
ineffective for not raising a rule 403 objection to the testimony. Aplt.Br.1618.

Defendant's challenge fails first because he never raised a rule 403
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objection to the evidence; rather, Defendant challenged Holmer' s offer
testimony on relevance grounds only, a claim he has now abandoned on
appeal. See Aplt.Br.9-18. Defendant's alternative argument, that his counsel
was ineffective because he did not raise a rule 403 objection to the offer
testimony, fails because Defendant has not proven-and cannot provedeficient performance or prejudice.
A. Defendant did not preserve a rule 403 objection to the offer
testimony.

"To preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be preserved to the
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on
that issue." State v. Alzaga, 2015 UT App 133, ,121, 352 P.3d 107 (citation and
quotation omitted). An objection on one ground "does not preserve for
appeal any alternative grounds for objection." Id. (citation and quotation
omitted).
Defendant argues that the h·ial court erred in overruling an alleged
prejudice objection to Agent Hohner's testimony that Defendant offered to
help the DEA gain access to a high-level heroin trafficker in Salt Lake City
in exchange for reduced charges. Aplt.Br.9-16. Defendant's argument fails
at the outset, however, because he did not preserve a rule 403 objection
below; rather, as shown in the Statement of the Case, above, Defendant's
only objection to this testimony was that it was irrelevant. See R414,R417-
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418. Instead of reasserting his relevance objection on appeal, Defendant
now asserts a rule 403 prejudice objection. Aplt.Br.9-15. But to the extent
that counsel raised a prejudice objection below, it went solely to Holmer' s
testimony that obliquely referenced Defendant's other cases, not Holmer' s
testimony about Defendant's offer to help the DEA in this case. Compare
R427-429 and R414,R418.

II

Because an objection on one ground does not

preserve for appeal any alternative grounds for objection," Defendant's rule
403 objection is unpreserved. Alzaga, 2015 UT App 133, ,r21 (citation and
quotation omitted).

This Court will thus review Defendant's rule 403
II

challenge to Holmer' s offer testimony only if Defendant can establish plain
error, ineffective assistance of counsel, or exceptional circumstances." State

v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, if34, 276 P.3d 1207.
Implicitly recognizing as n1uch, Defendant alternatively argues that
his counsel was ineffective for not raising a rule 403 objection to Holmer' s
offer testimony. See Aplt.Br.16-18.
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B.

Defendant cannot rebut the strong presumption that his
counsel reasonably decided to forgo a rule 403 objection to
the offer evidence; nor has he shown prejudice. 4

Defendant argues that his trial counsel should have objected under
rule 403 to Agent Holmer' s testimony that he offered to help the DEA gain
access to a high-level heroin trafficker in exchange for leniency.
Aplt.Br.10,16-18.

Defendant argues that the testimony was excludable

under rule 403 because there was "no evidence that the drug trafficker was
involved in the charged crime" - thus, Defendant argues, the evidence was
unfairly prejudicial. Aplt.Br.17. He further argues that Holmer's testimony
about Defendant's offer constituted Strickland prejudice because it appealed
"to the jury's passions or prejudices," and associated Defendant "with a
feared . . . group."

Aplt.Br.17-18 (quotation and citation omitted).

Defendant is mistaken on both counts.
To prevail on his ineffectiveness claim, Defendant "has the difficult
burden of showing actual unreasonable representation and actual prejudice."

State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1259 (Utah 1993) (emphasis in original).

A

failure to prove either element defeats an ineffectiveness claim. Strickland v.

4

Defendant raises a similar claim of ineffectiveness in a related case,
State v. Edgar, Case No. 20150594-CA. The State's Brief of Appellee in that
case was filed on 20 April 2016.
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 697 (1984); accord State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,
119 (Utah 1989). Defendant has not proven either Strickland element.
1. Defendant cannot rebut the slTong presumption that
counsel reasonably decided to forgo a rule 403 objection
because the offer testimony had slTong probative value
and posed little danger of unfair prejudice.

This Court's review of counsel's performance begins with a "strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance." State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah
1997) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). The presumption exists because
II

II

of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel" and the range of
legitimate decisions regarding how to best represent a criminal defendant."

Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1254; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The presumption
recognizes that, "[u]nlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the
relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted
with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge." Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011).
Defendant can rebut this strong presumption only "by persuading the
court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v.

Clark, 2004 UT 25, if 6, 89 P.3d 162 (emphasis in original) (quotations and
citation omitted).

The State is not required to articulate a reasonable

explanation for counsel's acts or omissions. Nor does a defendant succeed
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merely because this Court cannot conceive of a tactical explanation for
counsel's performance. Rather, '"the defendant"' always bears the burden
to '" overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy."' Benevenuto v.

State, 2007 UT 53, if19, 165 P.3d 1195 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see
also State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, ,I46, 154 P.3d 788. But when it is possible to
conceive of a reasonable tactical basis for trial counsel's actions, then a
defendant clearly has not rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel
performed reasonably. See Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,I7; State v. Holbert, 2002 UT
App 426, if 58, 61 P.3d 291.
Reasonably concluding that an objection will be futile is a conceivable
tactical basis for not raising that objection. Futile objections do not affect the
evidence before the jury. They do, however, have the potential to annoy or
even alienate the jury. Such objections can also annoy and alienate the trial
court and the prosecutor, with whom counsel may have to interact in the
future.

Thus, failure "to raise futile objections or motions does not

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Kennedy, 2015 UT App
152, ,ISO, 354 P.3d 775.
Defendant's counsel could have reasonably concluded that it would
have been futile to object to evidence of Defendant's offer under rule 403.
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That rule presumes that evidence is admissible and imposes a high hurdle
for excluding evidence. Relevant evidence may be excluded under the rule
only "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ...

unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added); see also State v. Burke,
2011 UT App 168,

,r

34, 256 P.3d 1102. The rule "imposes ... the heavy

burden not only to show that the risk of unfair prejudice is greater than the
probative value, but that it 'substantially outweigh[s]' the probative value."

State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, iJ29, 345 P.3d 1195 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 403)
(alteration in original). "Given this bar, [courts] 'indulge a presumption in
favor of admissibility."'

State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, if32, 328 P,3d 841

(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 1993)). Indeed, rule 403
"'is an "inclusionary" rule."' State v. Kooyman, 2005 UT App 222, if 26, 112
P.3d 1252 (quoting State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366,269 (Utah App. 1996)).
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only when it "has an 'undue tendency
to suggest decision upon an improper basis."' Lucero, 2014 UT 15,

if 32

(quoting State v. Bair, 2012 UT App 106, ~22, 275 P.3d 1050). Evidence "is
not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is detrimental to a party's case."

Kooyman, 2005 UT App 222, ,I26 (quoting United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d
1306, 1315 (10th Cir. 2001)).
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Counsel could have reasonably concluded that Agent Holmer' s
testi1nony about Defendant's offer to help the DEA had high probative
value for two reasons. First, it was directly relevant to the disputed issues
of whether Defendant knowingly possessed the drugs in the briefcase, and,

if so, whether he intended to distribute them. Second, counsel could have
reasonably concluded that the testimony arguably showed that Defendant
had tacitly admitted his guilt. Holmer testified that Defendant offered to
introduce him to a high-level heroin trafficker in exchange for reduced
charges, and asked him to contact the Utah County prosecutor in this case.
R419.

This evidence was highly probative of Defendant's knowledge and
intent with regard to the drugs in the briefcase. Counsel argued to jurors
that the drugs in the briefcase did not belong to Defendant because (1)
Defendant was driving someone else's Cadillac; (2) the briefcase was found
in the trunk after Defendant was taken from the scene; (3) Defendant never
admitted that the briefcase was his; and, (4) although Defendant had
property inside the briefcase, it also contained other peoples' property.
R572-574. Even if jurors believed that Defendant possessed the drugs in the

briefcase, however, counsel argued that the drugs were packaged in
individual user amounts, which was more consistent with personal use than
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with distribution. R574-575. Evidence that Defendant had direct access to a
high-level heroin trafficker made it highly likely that Defendant knowingly
possessed the myriad distributable drugs in the briefcase-including
heroin-and that he intended to distribute the drugs.

In other words,

Defendant's admission that he had access to a heroin wholesaler made it
highly likely that he was a drug retailer.
For example, in United States v. Haynes, 372 F.3d 1164, 1167 (10th Cir.
2004), the defendant's statement that he knew a woman who manufactured
methamphetamine using a particular method was admissible under federal
rule 403, even though it showed the defendant associated with drug dealers,
because the admission was highly probative of a disputed issue. Haynes
was charged with attempting to manufacture methamphetamine after
investigators found in his home various chemicals and equipment
associated with manufacturing meth. Id. at 1166. Haynes claimed that he
possessed the incriminating items only for making beer, and he introduced
testimony that some of the incriminating items had non-criminal uses. Id. at
1166-67. One of the substances found in his home contained a substantial
amount of phenyl-2-propanone (P2P), and one method for making
methamphetamine requires P2P. Id.
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Haynes objected under federal rule 403 when the prosecution offered
testimony that he told a DEA agent "that he knew a woman who
manufactured methamphetamine using the P2P method." Id. at 1167. He
argued that the evidence '"posed a danger that the jury would convict on
the ground that [he] apparently associated with drug dealers."'
(alteration in original).

Id.

The trial court overruled the objection and

"admitted the statement, saying that although it was prejudicial, it was also
'highly probative' of Defendant's knowledge." Id.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Id. at 1167-1168.

It held that the

state1nent was "relevant to show that Defendant was aware that P2P could
be used to manufacture methamphetamine" and therefore "shed[] light on
why Defendant possessed the various items seized frmn his home." Id. at
1167. Its probative value therefore was not substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice. Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 403).
Likewise, counsel here could have reasonably concluded that
Defendant's offer to help the DEA gain access to a high-level heroin
trafficker was highly probative of whether Defendant possessed and
intended to distribute the heroin and myriad other illicit drugs in the
briefcase.
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Counsel could have also reasonably concluded that Defendant's offer
was highly probative because it arguably amounted to a tacit admission of
his guilt. Defendant arguably admitted that he had engaged in criminal
behavior when, rather than disputing the allegations against him, he
attempted to obtain leniency by offering to introduce Agent Holmer to a
high-level heroin trafficker.
Additionally, the evidence's context reduced, or arguably eliminated,
any danger for unfair prejudice. Agent Holmer' s testimony was always tied
to Defendant's request for reduced charges in this case. See R419. Thus, the
jury did not hear only that Defendant knew a high-level heroin trafficker.
Rather, it heard that Defendant was offering to reveal this trafficker in
exchange for leniency in this case.

The jury would have therefore

understood the testimony to be important because it amounted to an
implicit admission of guilt, not merely evidence that Defendant knew a
high-level heroin trafficker.
Defendant cites several federal cases all holding that evidence that
shows only guilt by association is inadmissible under rule 403. Aplt.Br.17
(citing United States v. Echavarria-Olarte, 904 F.2d 1391, 1398 (9th Cir. 2006));

see also Aplt.Br.11-14 (citing, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724,
741-742 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Marshall, 173 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th
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Cir. 1999)). But none of those cases involved a defendant's admission that
he had access to a trafficker of large a1nounts of drugs, let alone an offer to
reveal his source in exchange for leniency. As explained, the evidence here
showed more than just that Defendant "knew a criminal." See Lopez-Medina,
461 F.3d at 742. Defendant's cases therefore do not establish that counsel
unreasonably chose not to object under rule 403.
In short, the challenged evidence was highly probative of Defendant's
guilt on the drug charges and possessed little, if any, danger of unfair
prejudice. Defendant therefore has not rebutted the strong presumption
that his counsel performed effectively by not objecting under rule 403.
2. Defendant cannot show prejudice because rule 403 would
not have excluded the offer evidence and, even if it would
have, the remaining evidence was overwhelming.

To establish prejudice, Defendant must show "'a reasonable
probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a
reasonable doubt respecting guilt."' State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, if 86, 152 P.3d
321 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). A reasonable probability is one
"sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Harrington, 562 U.S.
at 104 (quotations and citation omitted). Defendant must do more than
show "that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the
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proceeding." Id. "Counsel's errors must be 'so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."' Id.
Defendant cannot show prejudice because a rule 403 objection would
have in fact been futile. For the reasons explained above, the rule would not
have excluded evidence of Defendant's offer because its probative value
was not substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. Because
the failure "to raise futile objections or motions does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel," Defendant cannot show prejudice.

See

Kennedy, 2015 UT App 152, if 50.
But even if such a motion would have succeeded, Defendant still
cannot demonstrate prejudice because the remaining evidence against him
was overwhelming. There was no real dispute that the drugs belonged to
anyone other than Defendant, where he was found in sole possession of the
briefcase filled with drugs, including two prescription bottles of Oxycodone
that had labels bearing his name. See R435-446. Moreover, Defendant did
not introduce any evidence to dispute Detective Purvis's testimony that the
briefcase contained distributable amounts of myriad illicit drugs. See R474;

see also R455 ("[I]ts a large distributable amount"). In Purvis's twenty-one
years of experience, this type of packaging was a "common" practice among
"people distributing medications to other people." R474. Dealers typically
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use scales like those found in the briefcase to "weigh out the large quantities
to put in the smaller packages." R386-387. Given these uncontested facts,
there was no likelihood the jury would have reached a different result
absent evidence of Defendant's offer to help the DEA gain access to a highlevel heroin trafficker in exchange for leniency. Defendant therefore cannot
show that he was prejudiced by any deficient performance arising from a
lack of a rule 403 objection to the evidence. Consequently, he has not shown
that his counsel was ineffective for not making a rule 403 objection.
II.

DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS COUNSEL
· WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT OBJECTING TO THE
AMENDED
INFORMATION OR REQUESTING
A
CONTINUANCE

The morning of trial, the prosecutor moved to amend the information
to substitute a sports facility as the facility that triggered a drug-free-zone
penalty enhancement. See R171; see also R808-813. Defendant argues that his
counsel was ineffective because he did not object to the amendment.
Aplt.Br.18-19. Specifically, Defendant argues that the timing of the
amendment prevented his counsel "from fully developing his defense" i.e., counsel (1) "could not measure the distance between the new location
and the place where [Defendant] was arrested," and (2) he could not
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"investigate the type of business done at the new location." Aplt.Br.19-21.
Defendant cursorily concludes that he was therefore prejudiced. Aplt.Br.21.
Defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails at the outset because it is
unsupported in the record. Moreover, Defendant has not sought remand
under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to develop any nonspeculative evidence in support of his ineffectiveness claim.
This Court presumes that "any argument of ineffectiveness presented
to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of which defendant is aware."

State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,Il6, 12 P.3d 92.

If "the record appears

inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiency resulting therefrom
simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed
effectively." Id. at if 17. Defendant thus has the burden to provide evidence
of his counsel's alleged deficient performance and resulting prejudice. The
instant record is inadequate to support Defendant's claims of ineffective
assistance.
First, at the time of Defendant's 2013 arrest, the drug-free-zone
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a)(viii)-(ix) (West 2012), authorized
enhanced penalties for specified crimes committed "in a ... sports facility"
or "within any area that is within 1,000 feet" of a sports facility.

The

unconh·overted evidence at Defendant's trial established that the sports
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facility identified in the amended information was well within 1000 feet of
where Defendant was arrested with the briefcase full of drugs. See R455.
Absent any record evidence that the sports facility was, in fact, outside this
1000 foot zone, Defendant has not proven- and cannot prove- that his
counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the amendment or requesting a
continuance.

On this record, objectively reasonable counsel could have

concluded that any objection to the amendment, or request for a
continuance, would have been futile. See Kennedy, 2015 UT App 152,

if 50.

Defendant thus fails to prove deficient performance with regard to the 1000foot zone.
For essentially the same reason, Defendant fails to prove prejudice.
As shown, on this record, an objection would not have excluded the drugfree-zone evidence because the sports facility was well within the required
1000-foot zone. See R455. Because the failure "to raise futile objections or
motions does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel," Defendant
has not shown-and cannot show-prejudice. See Kennedy, 2015 UT App
152,

,,so.
Finally, Defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not

objecting or requesting a continuance to research "the type of business
done" at the sports facility, is similarly unsupported. Aplt. Br.21. Indeed,
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the· record reflects that trial counsel in fact researched the sports facility
online and also interviewed an owner before she testified. See R808-813.
Defendant makes no attempt to show that these efforts fell outside the
"wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1254;

see Aplt.Br.18-21. He thus fails to rebut the strong presumption of effective
assistance. See Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1254.
For essentially the same reason, Defendant fails to establish any
prejudice. The record does not support that any additional investigation
would have allowed counsel to successfully challenge the drug-free-zone
evidence on any basis.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on May 18, 2016.
SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General

MR1AN DECKER

Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for Appellee
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Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights, USCA CONST Amend ....

United States Code Annotated
Constitution of the United States
Annotated
Amendment VI. Jury Trial for Crimes, and Procedural Rights (Refs &Annas)
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VI-Jury trials
Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights
Currentness
<Notes of Decisions for this amendment are displayed in three separate documents. Notes of Decisions for
subdivisions I through XX are contained in this document. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XXI through
XXIX, see the second document for Amend. VI. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XXX through XXXIII, see
the third document for Amend. VI.>

\iii)

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Notes of Decisions (5274)
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VI-Jury trials, USCA CONST Amend. VI-Jury trials
Current through P.L. 114-143. Also includes P.L. 114-145 and 114-146.
Fntl of Docutnl'lll

! '.

20 I ti Thomson Rt:utcrs. t\o claim to original U.S. (iovl.!rntm:nt Works.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter~ , Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
I
i•
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I

.,,;';'.,

Addendum B

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

•

•

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

Lindon CitY P .O .
100 North State Street
Lindon. UT 84042
(801) 769~8600

suspect

,
2
3
4

ooe

Name

--------=----...---------=
--=------------------------=
•

r

-

'.l-?se.lZEO, l-:1ii1
Jf/\ i,/1

OFFENSE: :;>cu,,} _;._ l
OATE &. TIME
_f
LOCATION: _ ¥10 d ~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•
•

•
#
#

•

#
#

#
#

Ll DON POLICE

DEPARTMENT

INC#: l 3Ll04181
LOC: L!S26

DESC: CS-Prescribed Pill

11111111111111111111 IIIII IIIIII
13LTE0489

•

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Lindon City P.O.
100 North State Street
Lindon, UT 84042
(801) 769-8600
Suspect
Name

1

_J il,t~ \ e:,~

DOB

2 .:::,......~.........,;;,,--.-:--~~-----~~
3 ...,::....;;..:......----...;......:+~~--~-~--4 .;.::.;...-~-...;.;..---:~----':"~~ ..::....:-,-

OFFENSE: ..,.;$&S,\l~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ DATE & TtME SEI
LO~ON: !JJD.:..-U~~ ~~ ~ ~

•
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Ll1'D0N POLICE

DEPARTMENT
INC#: t 3LI04 l 8 l
LOC: LIS26
·
DESC: CS-Prescribed Unknown

I\1111111111IIIII\1\lllll\1111111Ill

____

'-

..

t 3l.TE048 l

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

•
Lindon City P.O.
100 North State Street

Lindon, UT 84042
(801) 769-8600
Suspect
Name

1

tt,J;c/.oc. L FJ,,.e

DOB

2 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

3 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

•

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

•

•

•

•

•

Lindon City P.O.
100 North State Street

Lindon, UT 84042
(801) 769-8600
Suspect _\

~

2
3

Name .

l½~~ I

1

DOB

5 rJ. '9L
#

4
~
OFFENSE:
NS I _ - I)
DATE & TIME ~ ZED:,.1!__.~:_:..__i_
g;,::-:i:~~ (J
-;-"LOCATION: _:
':J_l..J/~C)
~ ,~
.,. ~=---~ -

#

#

#
#

LINDON POI .rCF

DEP/\ RT1\1ENT
INC#: l 3ll04 l 8 l
LOC: LIS26
DESC: CS-Methamph~tan1 Crystal

II Ill11111111111111111111111111111

,\f'.;r\ "6\\
I\

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

•

•

LIN DO POLH..: E OEPARTl\fENT

TNC#; I3LT041 8I
LOC: L1S26
DESC: CS-Prescribed Oxycodont· Pill

•

II IIIIIIIIIll II/111111111111111111111
13LIE0474

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Case# l3L:tOYJ9'/
Pr~perty #
b)U
Officer ;?&Jt\S
t e~

,,,,,

umbeJr and Description
~

</ p;Hs

LINDON POLICE DEPART1\fENT
-

-

INC#; 13LT04 I 81
LOC: LlS:!6
DESC: CS-Pl'escribed OXycodone Pill

I 111111111\111111\\III\I\III\\\\\\
13LIE0474

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

LlNDON POLJCE~
I)EPARTMENT
INC#: 13LI04 I 8]
LOC: LIS26
DES(~: CS-Prescribed zolpi<lem

11 11111111 1111111111111
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-c.:::.• - - 1

..

----

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•
•
•
•
LINDO~ POLICE DF.PARTl\fENT

LOC: LIS:26
DESC: CS-Prescribed xanax alprazola

JNC#: 13LT04 181

I Ill

111111111111111111 llll II Ill I
13LIE0483

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

•

Ll NDO. POLICE DEPARThfENT
I NC#: 13U04 181
L OC: LIS26
DESC: CS-Prescr ibed Cloua2epum

IIIIIIIIIIllIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII Ill
13UE0486

•

•
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

LINDON POLICE , ~ ,
DEPARTMENT
"~
INC#: 13LI0418 l
LOC: LIS26
DESC: CS-Prescribed Pills

I

•

IIII Ill III 1111111 1111111111

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Case #
Jll..1!o 'ft'll
Property #
t,7,r,,_
Officer
/>c,rfliS
tm Number and Description

.,.ycodo IIC.

•

'

LINDON POLICE

DEPARTMENT

INC#: 13LI0418 1
LOC: LIS26
DESC: CS-Presc1ibed Pills

1111111 YI ml 11111111111111

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•
•
•

LIN DON POLICE DEPARTl\lENT

•

INC#: 13LT04181
LOC: LIS26
DESC: CS-Prescribed Oxycontin

I 1111 Ill 111111111111111
13LIE0475

~

-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

•

•

•

L DO POLICE DEPARTI\(ENT
It C#~ 13LT04181
LOC: L1S26
: CS-Prescribe.ct Oxycodone Pill

IlflIIiIIl lll tllllll11
13llE04so

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

L1 t.;;t: 04 I I I
'roperty #
,13 Z
,se #

A't,\('"is

fficer
and Descriot1on

LINDON POLICE DEP4 RT.\ (ENT
TNC#: l3U04J8 /

t oe: L1S26

DESC: CS-Presc,;bed Oxycodone Pill

lfflll!l!!fflUI/Hlllllll/1 .
13LfE04go

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

#

_

# # --

,

# -# --

LINDONPoLrct BIPARTMENT
INC#: IJU0-1131 LOr: Lis26
.
DESC: CS.~lllli ~hetamine Pill

Ill/111111111 11

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

•

•

.Lindon C ity P . O .
Lindon, UT 84042
(801) 769-8600

/ V\ \

•

•

Case # 13 ~ t.f( ?(
Property #
Officer
,3 . ~
Item ~ umber and Description

13./

100- North Stat& Street
S u ~ _\ N:me
1
Ot~J 5

•

d

DOB

sec

----- -----

·~3 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
4 - - -- ~ i;::;::-::---l!t""OFFENSE: _ _.__.,_____'=-tf-;:::;r--=OATE & TIME SRIZED: ~~~
LOCATION: ---=
l..f__I rO='"----~-•·- - ----

1t

#
#

Sc,. f L

f , \\ h::>-ffl~

c...)~tb ~~

#

It
# #

I# -

I.INOo:,,; rot.l<:E: flt-:l'ARnrP,r

-

I N(."#: IJI l°" llll

l.OC: LISl1,

u ~;sr: CS.rJr.ipl1cniJh Sc-Jfh My \Vc,!lhl

IIIH
lllllll~lllllllllll li
13!. tE0478

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

•

•

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

•

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- -·--··- - - - -- -- -- -------

02/27/2015

CL Case#:
Agency:
ORI:

·-----·-·

·- -- ---- ---- ----- - - -

Utah Bureau of Forensic Services
4501 South Constitution Blvd, Salt Lake City, UT 84129 (801) 965-4487
C20131772
LCP - LINDON CITY POLICE DEPT.

Agency Case #:
Report#:

Page 1 of 2

13LI04181
602794

Crimlnalistic Analysis Report - CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ANALYSIS

•

Evidence Submission Information
Evidence Submitted:
How Received:
Haz. Materials:
Submitted By:
Delivered By:
Received By:

02/18/2015
IN PERSON
NONE
ALAN PURVIS ph. (801)769-8600
ROBYN CLARK ph. (801 )769-8600
ALEXIS NELSON ph. (801)965-4560

Victims and Suspects
Vic/Suso
Name
Suspect
EDGAR, MICHAEL JOHN

•

DOB
09/16/1980

Sex
M

Crimes
NCIC Code Descriotion
DRUGS/ CO~H.SUB. / PARAPHERNALIA
3599
CHAIN OF CUSTODY STATEMENT

Re: Chain of Custodv

The item(s) submitted under the police agency case numbers referenced in this report were in a sealed condition at the time any examination, testing, or analysis was commenced by the undersigned , and that said examination or handling, if
any, of the actual items within any such sealed containers was accomplished in a manner to preserve the integrity of the
item to assure that any chance of misidentification, or environmental cross-contamination would be avoided by adherence
to standardized procedures within the Utah State Crime Laboratory appropriate to any processes applicable to the
examination, analysis, or testing of said items. Any deviation from said procedures, and reasons therefore is noted below.
The breaking of any seal or part of the container in which the item was submitted, has been followed by a reinsertion of the
item into its original container, followed by any examination, testing or analysis and resealing of that container with the
undersigned's initials placed over such new seal.

Criminalistics Analysis Report and Conclusions

•
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02/27/2015

CL Case#:
Agency:
ORI:

----------- ---- -·-----------

Utah Bureau of Forensic Services
4501 South Constitution Blvd, Salt Lake City, UT 84129 (801) 965-4487

C20131772
LCP ~ LINDON CITY POLICE DEPT.

Agency Case #:
Report#:

Page 2 of 2

13LI04181
602794

Criminalistic Analysis Report - CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ANALYSIS

Pkg 1.
Item 2. The orange oval tablet marked "b 974 - - - 30" was physically identified as a preparation of amphetamine.
Item 3. Alprazolam was identified in the partial yellow tablet.
Item 4. Methamphetamine was identified in the plastic bag. The total weight of the white crystalline powder was 245
milligrams+/- 2.milligrams.
Item 5. The white round tablet marked "223" was physically identified as a preparation of oxycodone.
Item 6. The yellow round tablet marked "A111 was physically identified as a preparation of zolpidem.
Item 7. No controlled substances were identified in the partial orange tablet.
Item 8. The blue oval tablet marked 11605 11 was physically identified as a preparation of alprazolam.
Item 9. The yellow round tablet marked "M - - - C 13" was physically identified as a preparation of clonazepam.
Item 10. The light green round tablet marked "M - - - 15" was physically identified as a preparation of oxycodone.
Item 11. The blue round tablet marked "A 215" was physlcally identified as a preparation of oxycodone.
Item 12. The white oblon~ tablet marked "WATSON 385" was physically identified as a preparation of hydrocodone.
Item 13. The purple round tablet marked "M - - - 30" was physically identified as a preparation of morphine.
Item 14. Methamphetami11e was identified in the seven plastic bags and two plastic containers. The total weight of the
white crystalline powder was 9.572 grams +/- 0.006 grams.
Weight measurement uncertainty calculated at a coverage probability of 95.45%.

I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed On: 2/27/2015

Ryan Barney, M.S.
Senior Forensic Scientist
Central Crime Lab
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CL Case#:
Agency:
ORI:

Utah Bureau of Forensic Services
4501 South Constitution Blvd, Salt Lake City, UT 84129 (801) 965-4487
C20131772
LCP - LINDON CITY POLICE DEPT.

Agency Case #:
Report#:

Page 1 of 2

13LI04181
607574

Criminalistic Analysis Report - CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ANALYSIS

•

Evidence Submission Information
Evidence Submitted:
How Received:
Haz. Materials:
Submitted By:
Delivered By:
Received By:

03/12/2015
IN PERSON
NONE
ALAN PURVIS ph. (801)769-8600
ROBYN COOPER ph. (801)769-8600
ALEXIS NELSON ph. (801)965-4560

Victims and Susp ects
Vic/Suso
Name
Suspect
EDGAR, MIC'-iAEL JOHN
•

DOB
09/16/1980

Sex
M

Race
W

Crimes
NCIC Code Descriotion
3599
DRUGS / CONT.SUB./ PARAPHERNALIA

•

CHAIN OF CUSTODY STA TEMENT

Re: Chain of Custody

The item(s) submitted under the police agency case numbers referenced in this report were in a sealed condition at the
time any examination, testing, or analysis was commenced by the undersigned, and that said examination or handling, if
any, of the actual items within any such sealed containers was accomplished in a manner to preserve the integrity of the
item to assure thai any chance of misidentification, or environmental cross-contamination would be avoided by adherence
to standardized procedures within the Utah State Crime Laboratory appropriate to any processes applicable to the
examination, analysis, or testing of said items. Any deviation from said procedures, and reasons therefore is noted below.
The breaking of any seal or part of the container in which the item was submitted, has been follo~ved by a reinsertion of the
item into its original container, followed by any examination, testing or analysis and resealing of that container with the
undersigned's initials placed over such new seal.

Criminalistics Analysis Report and Conclusions

•
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03/20/2015

CL Case#:
Agency:
ORI:

Utah Bureau of Forensic Services
4501 South Constitution Blvd, Salt Lake City, UT 84129 (801) 965-4487

C20131772
LCP · LINDON CITY POLICE DEPT.

Agency Case #:
Report#:

Page 2 of 2

13LI04181
607574

Crlminalistic Analysis Report .. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ANALYSIS

Item 1. 251-NBOMe was identified on the piece of colored paper. The piece of foll was not analyzed.
Item 15. Heroin was identified in the prescription bottle. The total weight of the dark brown solid was less than 50
milligrams. Heroin was identified in the plastic bag. The total weight of the brown powder was 202 milligrams +/- 2
milligrams. Heroin was identified In the plastic bag. The total weight of the dark brown solid was 294 milligrams +/- 2
milligrams.
Weight measurement uncertainty calculated at a coverage probability of 95.45%.

I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed On: 3/20/2015_

'-~C::c·
. 2s?_ · . •.
~-:··~;

~.··.
.

.

..

.

-

-.

..

Ryan Barney, M. S.
Senior Forensic Scientist
Central Crime Lab

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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11/21/2013

CL Case#:
Agency:
ORI:

Utah Bureau of Forensic Services
4501 South Constitution Blvd, Salt Lake City, UT 84129 (801) 965-4487
C20131772
LCP - LINDON CITY POLICE DEPT.

Agency Case #:
Report#:

Page 1 of 2

13LI04181
524415

Cri minalistic Analysis Report - CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ANALYSIS
Evidence Submission lrformation
Evidence Submitted:
How Received:
Haz. Materials:
Submitted By:
Delivered By:
Received By:

11/13/2013
IN PERSON
NONE
ALAN PURVIS ph. (801 )769-8600
ROBYN CLARK ph. (801)769-8600
MICHELLE HARWARD ph. (801 )965-4621

·i

I

Victims and Suspects
Vic/Susp
Name
Suspect
EDGAR, MICHAEL JOHN

DOB
09/ 16/1 980

Sex
M

Race

w

Crimes
NCIC Code Description
3599
DRUGS / CONT.SUB./ PARAPHERNALIA
CHAIN OF CUSTODY STATEMENT

•

Re: Chain of Custody

The item(s) submitted unr:te·r the police agency case numbers referenced in this report were in a sealed condition at the
time any examination, te!:>ting, or analysis was commenced by the undersigned, and that said examination or handling, if
any, of the actual items w!thin any such sealed containers was accomplished in a manner to preserve the integrity of the
Item to assure that any chance of misidentification, or environmental cross-contamination would be avoided by adherence
to standardized procedures within the Utah State Crime Laboratory appropriate to any processes applicable to the
examination, analysis, or tesiing of said items. Any deviation from said procedures, and reasons therefore is noted below.
The breaking of any seal or part of the container in which the item was submitted, has been followed by a reinsertion of the
item into its original cont2iner, followed by any examination, testing or analysis and resealing of that container with the
undersigned's initials placed over such new seal.

Criminalistics Analysis Report and Co nclusions

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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11/21 /2013

CL Case#:
Agency:
ORI:

Utah Bureau of Forensic Services
4501 South Constitution Blvd, Salt Lake City, UT 84129 (801) 965-4487
C20131772
.
LCP - LINDON CITY POLICE DEPT.

Agency Case #:
Report#:

Page 2 of 2

13LI04181
524415

Criminalistic Analysis Report · CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ANALYSIS

Item 1) 251-NBOMe was ldeniified on the paper. The piece of foil was not ·analyzed.

I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foreg oing is true and correct.
Executed On: 11/21/2013

Mike Saunders, M.S.
Forensic Scientist II
Central Crime Lab

•
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FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPT.
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Case No. 131403330

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellate Court Case No. 20150605

Plaintiff,

Volume I of II

V

MICHAEL JOHN EDGAR,
With Keyword Index

Defendant.

JURY TRIAL APRIL 9 & 10, 2015
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE LYNN W. DA VIS

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186
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APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

CRAIG R. JOHNSON
Deputy Utah County Attorney

For the Defendant:

GREGORY V. STEWART
Attorney at Law
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73
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Direct Examination by Mr. Johnson
Cross Examination by Mr. Stewart
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Direct Examination by Mr. Johnson
Cross Examination by Mr. Stewart
Redirect Examination by Mr. Johnson
Re-Cross Examination by Mr. Stewart
Further Redirect Examination by Mr. Johnson
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173
196
200
202

KJARSTENA SCHARERRER
Direct Examination by Mr. Johnson
Cross Examination by Mr. Stewart

116

BRANDON HOLMER
Direct Examination by Mr. Johnson
Cross Examination by Mr. Stewart
Redirect Examination by Mr. Johnson

126
150
150

108
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1

Craig Johnson, was the guy handling his case and so that's

2

when I called you.

3

Q

Okay.

4

A

No.

5

Q

Your contact came from Mr. Edgar?

6

A

That's correct.

7

Q

And what did he say to you when he got ahold of you

8

on the phone?
MR. STEWART:

9

10

Judge,

just for the record, we would

object to this on the grounds of relevance to this case.
THE COURT:

11

12

I didn't seek you out independently?

I don't know the relevance.

We can

address it outside the presence of the jury if you wish to.
MR. JOHNSON:

13

I think my proffer at the bench

14

should be sufficient for us to continue with the line of

15

questioning at this point.
THE COURT:

16
17

But let's make a record outside the

presence of the jury then.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, in light of that

18
19

we will take up a legal discussion outside the presence of

20

the jury, excuse you at this point in time and caution you

21

not to discuss the case with anyone.

22

don't show those to anyone and don't attempt to learn

23

anything about this case outside this courtroom setting.

24

course avoid any radio, TV,

25

trial.

If you've taken notes,

Of

newspaper, comments about the

With that we'll excuse the jury, then we'll take up
132
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1

these matters outside your presence and once I've ruled then

2

we will invite you back in.

Thank you.

3·

{Whereupon the jury left the courtroom)

4

THE COURT:

The jury has been excused.

5

objection.

6

counsel, you may state that basis.

The basis hasn't been stated on the record and,

MR. STEWART:

7

You may then respond.

Judge, again,

8

perfectly clear for the record,

9

relevance to this case.

10

There is an

just to make this

I object on the basis of

This case happened in November of

2013.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. STEWART:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. STEWART:

15

THE COURT:

This contact was July 29, 2015.
'14.
'14, excuse me, all right.

Okay.

Seven or eight months after this.
Now I don't know the facts involved

16

here and you can respond briefly to that and we may need to

17

take some testimony so that in fact I can MR. JOHNSON:

18
19

22
23
24
25

I'll just ask a

couple of questions and we'll see where that takes us.
THE COURT:

20

21

Let's just do that.

Q

Okay, very well.

(BY MR. JOHNSON)

Agent Holmer, why did Mr. Edgar

indicate that he was contacting you?
A

He was seeking consideration with pending charges

by cooperating with law enforcement on other cases.
Q

State level or federal level?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

A

To my knowledge his charges were at state level.
MR. JOHNSON:

2

And Judge, the Court can take

3

judicial notice that this case, among several others were

4

pending at the time of this conversation with Agent Holmer

5

and the defendant.

6

cases.

7

8

I was the prosecutor on all of those

THE COURT:

So he would cooperate with a federal

agent as it relates to -

9

Q

(BY MR. JOHNSON)

10

cooperated?

11

A

What did he want you to do if he

He seemed to believe that I could supercede the

12

authority of the state and compel them to help him out with

13

his charges.

14

Q

How did my name get brought up with respect to

16

A

He told me that you were the prosecutor.

17

Q

Okay.

15

18
19

that?

And that by contacting me, what might

happen?
A

That he might be given a stay on the current status

20

of these charges or a reduction in his charges because of my

21

involvement and his cooperation with us.

22
23

THE COURT:

And did he promise anything in

connection with that as it relates to cooperation?

24

THE WITNESS:

25

THE COURT:

Obviously Your tie is running into the mike.
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1

THE WITNESS:

2

THE COURT:

3

THE WITNESS:

Sorry.
It's all right.
So, so whenever someone contacts me

4

I'm going to try and determine what their usefulness is to

5

the government.

6

willing to provide, what level of trafficker he could give me

7

access to and what actions he could take specifically with

8

regard to that activity.

So I questioned him about what he would be

9

Q

(BY MR. JOHNSON) How did he respond to that?

10

A

He indicated that he had access to a high level

11

Mexican heroin trafficker that operated out of the Salt Lake

12

City area.

13
14
15

Q

Okay, how much, how much quantity-wise of drugs

could he get access to?
A

Pound level quantities.

So significant

16

distribution quantities.

17

loads of heroin, we're obviously interested.

18

good sized trafficker.

19

MR. JOHNSON:

20

relevance has been established.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. STEWART:

23
24
25

Anytime there's going to be pound
That's a fairly

Judge, based on that I think the

Anything further,

counsel?

Ummm - no, Judge, we'll stand on

what's been presented (inaudible) the objection.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Well,

I'll overrule the

objection to outside the presence of the jury I make a
135
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1

determination as it relates to the nature of the

2

conversations, the basis of the conversation and the

3

projection as it relates to the usefulness of the information

4

that could be provided and that it related specifically to

5

this pending, these pending charges because there's a

6

reference directly to Mr. Craig Johnson as Deputy Utah County

7

Attorney and I will find by virtue of that and the admissions

8

involved that it is relevant.

9

So we'll invite the jury back in.

10

And it's sort of an admission against interest.

I

11

would make the further observation that there's been

12

testimony already that some of the drugs involved were

13

heroin; and secondarily, the independent contact by the

14

defendant with a federal agent was initiated by him and that

15

secondarily that it would be admissions against interest.

16

(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom)

17

THE COURT:

We are back on the record in the case

18

of state of Utah vs. Michael Edgar, Case No. 131403330.

19

Counsel and clients are present, the jury is now seated and

20

that we had some testimony elicited outside the presence of

21

the jury.

22

counsel.

23

24
25

The Court has made a ruling and you may proceed

MR. JOHNSON:
Q

Thank you.

(BY MR. JOHNSON)

You said Mr. Edgar contacted you

on the duty phone around July 28,

2014?
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1

A

Yes, sir.

2

Q

And describe that conversation from the beginning.

3

I guess had you ever talked to him before this?

4

A

No,

5

Q

Okay, so describe the conversation please.

6

A

So Mr. Edgar identified himself, told me that he

never.

7

was seeking to cooperate with law enforcement in regard to

8

heroin trafficking or heroin trafficker that was operating

9

out of the Salt Lake City area and that he would do so in

10

exchange for consideration with his pending charges in Utah

11

County.

12

cases and we had a discussion about what his ability,

13

could provide, what services he could provide to me

14

specifically in the course of investigation.
THE COURT:

15
16

He identified Mr. Johnson as the prosecutor over his
what he

Let me have counsel approach just

quickly and then -

17

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:

18

THE COURT:

He made a generic reference to his

19

cases.

I don't want any plurality as it relates to this jury

20

knowing that there are other pending cases.

21

could refer to multiple charges in this case certainly but if

22

you will instruct him that I've got to narrow that.

23

potentially approaching prejudicial if he goes into each of

24

the cases and the number of charges and the nature of the

25

charges and everything else.

Now the cases

It's

:

I
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1

(Inaudible conversation)

2

THE COURT:

Okay, what are we doing to do?

It's a

3

fine balance as it relates to that because I don't want all

4

four cases to be before this jury MR. JOHNSON: It would be those two, but

5

6

(inaudible).

7

THE COURT:

8

protect your client?

I know.

MR. JOHNSON:

9

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. JOHNSON:

12

THE COURT:

What do you do?

How do you

(Inaudible) .
I know.

I know.

(Inaudible) .
Okay, yeah, he probably did.

Umrnm,

if

13

you will just advise this witness that beyond what he has

14

testified to or he heard from him that he can't open the door

15

to all the other cases that are pending and everything else

16

that way.

17

MR. JOHNSON:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. JOHNSON:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. STEWART:

22

(End of sidebar)

23

THE COURT:

24

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:

25

THE COURT:

(Inaudible) .
I

know.

If there's a specificity but -

(Inaudible) .
Okay.
(Inaudible) irrelevant to this case.

Approach again if you will, counsel.

Again, even though the discussion may
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1

be, may involve other cases or other pending charges and it's

2

an admission on his part - I think opening that door before

3

this jury as it relates to exclusively here is a real

4

problem.

5

wasn't aware of it until two minutes ago.

So I don't know how to resolve that,

6

MR. JOHNSON:

7

THE COURT:

you know,

I

(Inaudible) he created it.
I know he created it.

It is relevant.

What do you do?

8

Is it relevant?

It's relevant as it relates

9

to the fact that he knows contacts and heroin traffickers and
everybody else and all that -

10
11

MR. JOHNSON:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. JOHNSON:

14

THE COURT:

15

(End of sidebar)

16

(Inaudible) .
I know.
(Inaudible).
I don't know.

(BY MR. JOHNSON)

Q

Be cautious.

Okay, Agent Holmer, so to just

17

reorient ourselves where we were, Mr. Edgar talked to you,

18

called you to talk about working out some considerations,

19

some sort of deal on his Utah County charges, drug charges?

20

A

Correct.

21

Q

Okay.

And as part of that, he was talking about

22

what he could offer in exchange for you trying to pull some

23

strings perhaps?

24

A

Yes,

sir, that's correct.

25

Q

Specifically, I guess what - do you use

I
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1

confidential sources as part of your job?

2

A

Yes,

3

Q

Okay.

it's a huge part of what we do.
And so in speaking with Mr. Edgar,

I mean,

4

what factors play into whether you're going to actually use a

5

confidential source?

6

A

First thing would be what they can actually

7

provide, their access and placement to drug traffickers.

8

Then there are a number of other factors that we take into

9

that which include their ability to be controlled and then

10

possibly most important, how truthful and whether or not we

11

can trust them which is a delicate matter because anytime

12

you're dealing with confidential source, obviously they've

13

probably doing something they shouldn't have been doing

14

previously.

15

Q

Okay.

And so in talking with Mr. Edgar,

16

specifically when you're talking about what he could do for

17

you, what was that conversation about?

18

A

Had to do with specifically access to a heroin

19

trafficker who was capable of moving large quantities of

20

heroin.

21

22
23

Q

Did you discuss that any further with him about

what large quantities mean?
A

Well, we had to, as I recall we had to kind of

24

break it down because what one person considers a large

25

quantity may not necessarily be what I consider a large
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1

quantity or something that's worth my time and efforts,

2

quite simply because I get paid by the taxpayers to target

3

large trafficking organizations.

4

quantify what large quantities was and I believe it was

5

pounds specifically that we discussed, that he was capable of

6

dealing in pounds of heroin which,

7

my time.

8
9

10

Q

Okay.

So, as I recall, we had to

for the record, was worth

Do you happen to know the street value of

pounds of heroin?
A

I believe it's over $10,000.

11

20 for a kilo, something like that,

12

confirm that.

13

just

Q

I think we're paying

$20,000.

So what else did Mr. Edgar - well,

I'd have to

I guess at that

14

point were there some baseline rules that you talked to Mr.

15

Edgar about working with him?

16

A

Well,

I always try and kind of lay down

17

expectations.

18

management is them understanding exactly what we are willing

19

to do and not do, what they're allowed to do and not do and

20

one thing that I think has some bearing is that we

21

established that we do not make promises other than the fact

22

that we are going to make recommendations.

23

dictate the terms of their cooperation when they're working

24

as a defendant, confidential source, meaning they're giving

25

us cooperation in exchange for consideration with charges.

That's a big part of confidential source

So I do not
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1

We make recommendations to prosecutors and we make

2

recommendations to judges but we have no bearing on what they

3

decide to do.

4

seriously.

So generally speaking, those are taken pretty

5

Q

And you explained that to Mr. Edgar?

6

A

I explained that almost every time I speak to a

7

confidential source whose looking to work with us.

8
9

10
11

12
13

14

Q

Okay.

And was he willing to go along with that

A

I believe he understood that.

or ...
I think I made

myself very clear.
Q

Did he discuss with you working with any other

officers on a state level?
A

Yes, he did.

And that's another aspect of source

15

management, what's important is we, we always try and find

16

out if they are currently or have previously worked with

17

anyone else in law enforcement.

18

MR. STEWART:

19

THE COURT:

20

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:

21

MR. STEWART:

22

THE COURT:

23

else that way.

Judge,

can we approach?

You may.

(Inaudible) .
Can't go into any previous or anything

There's no - that's improper.

24

(Inaudible conversation)

25

MR. JOHNSON:

Agent Holmer (inaudible).
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. JOHNSON:

3

Okay (Inaudible) his conversation

(inaudible) in connection with his client (inaudible).

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. STEWART:

6

THE COURT:

Pardon me?
I

(inaudible).

What we've got here is that you've got

7

the - he can't talk about his past at all.

8

this case but he can't talk about the fact that he's served

9

as a confidential informant in the past in any form or

10

fashion.

11

that's totally out.
MR. JOHNSON:

12
13

That's out totally,

He can talk about

in my estimation.

Okay?

So

(Inaudible) and because of this case

and the case (inaudible) he's trying to (inaudible).

14

MR. STEWART:

15

THE COURT:

(Inaudible).
Well, you can call Agent Palmer as it

16

relates to that if he independently goes to him and you can

17

call him as it relates to MR. JOHNSON:

18
19

that's okay with Mr. Stewart (inaudible).

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. STEWART:

22

THE COURT:

23

I've decleared him as a witness and

that.

Okay.

Well,

I don't -

(Inaudible).
- I don't want, yeah, no you can't do

I don't want a mistrial in this case.

24

MR. JOHNSON:

25

THE COURT:

It's not a mistrial (inaudible).
And it's delicate as it relates to that
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1

in my estimation.

MR. STEWART: Well, when he's done I'd like to break

2
3

So ...

(inaudible) .

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. STEWART:

6

a

Pardon me?
When he's done I'd like to break for

(inaudible) .

7

THE COURT:

Well, we can do it, we can do it right

8

now because we've got to make a determination as it relates

9

to the breadth of the direct examination from this point

,10

forward.

11

MR. STEWART:

12

THE COURT:

13

(End of sidebar)

14

THE COURT:

(Inaudible).
We'll take another break.

We'll take another break so that we can

15

discuss some legal matters outside the presence of the jury,

16

and I will caution you not to discuss the case with anyone.

17

If you've taken notes don't show those to anyone. Don't

18

attempt to learn anything about the case outside this

19

courtroom setting and avoid, of course, any radio, TV,

20

newspaper comments about the trial.

21

outside the presence of the jury.

We'll take matters up
Thank you.

22

(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom)

23

THE COURT:

24

The record will reflect that the jury has been

25·

Mr. Holmer, you may be seated.

excused and counsel wish to discuss some further legal
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1

matters outside the presence of the jury and first of all in

2

connection with that, Mr. Stewart, you may be heard.

3

MR. STEWART:

Judge,

I think we're bordering on

4

testimony here that could easily lead to a mistrial.

5

Holmer has mentioned other cases, he's mentioned in working

6

with other state agents that won't be involved in this case,

7

he's talked about matters that happened well after November

8

7, 2013 and I think the jurors have almost heard enough that,

9

to further implicate Mr. Edgar in other matters.

1-0

THE COURT:

11

MR. STEWART:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. JOHNSON:

14
15

Agent

Okay.
Besides what we Mr. Johnson, you may be heard.
Thank you, Your Honor.

Just a

second.
This testimony is 100 percent bourne out of a

16

contact that was initiated by the defendant.

The defendant

17

took a great risk in doing this, doing it under the nose of

18

his attorney at the time who as far as I know had no

19

knowledge of this conversation.

20

Holmer is an admission by a party opponent and.is admissible.

21

It's relevant and frankly,

22

more prejudicial than probative.

23

the defendant, it's certainly extremely probative of the

24

defendant's knowledge,

25

substances in the briefcase.

Anything he says to Agent

under 403, it's not substantially
While it is prejudicial to

intent in possessing the controlled
Where the argument is going to
145
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1

be that, oh, it just was in the car, that he was borrowing

2

from someone or whatever and he doesn't own what's in there.

3

Certainly conversations to a DEA agent about trying to

4

negotiate this case and another case that happened on

5

November 21 st also in Lindon, the case officer in that case

6

was Detective Palmer, deputy with - actually he was an

7

officer with Provo Police Department who was with the Maior

8

Crimes Task Force at the time and during that interaction,

9

two weeks after this case, the defendant tried to negotiate

10

this case and that case with Detective Palmer.

11

didn't work out, he then tried to negotiate this case with

12

Agent Holmer and gave Agent Holmer information about his

13

interactions with Detective Palmer.

14

When that

At sidebar, when we spoke about this a couple of

15

sidebars ago, the Court said that we could go into what

16

Detective Palmer's interaction and involvement was with this

17

as long as I cautioned Agent Holmer to refer to his other

18

cases as pending state drugs charges or pending Utah County

19

drug charges or pending Lindon drug charges as opposed to

20

saying there were multiple cases and I did instruct Agent

21

Holmer about that and I've been trying to keep to that in

22

directing my questions and so far I think we've done that.

· 23

So then when we go and talk about Detective Palmer and then

24

the objection is raised again, after we just said that was

25

allowed, permissible, that's problematic for the State based
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1

on the Court's· prior ruling.

2

Again, this is information that came to my

3

attention because the defendant called Agent Holmer,

4

Agent Holmer my name, gave Agent Holmer Detective Palmer's

5

information and said this is what I can offer you,

6

you can do with them, contact them and try to work out my

7

case.

8

He said as much.

9

happened, he wasn't seeking to set him up or something.

gave

see what

This is nothing me seeking this out from the agent.
Agent never talked to Mr. Edgar before this
This

10

is a mess that was created by the defendant and while i t ' s

11

prejudicial and problematic and whatever you want to call it,

12

it's still lawful under the rules of evidence and ummm,

13

so for that reason I think we should be allowed to continue

14

in this vein of questioning.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. STEWART:

Mr. Stewart, anything further,

and

sir?

The prejudicial nature of the

17

testimony, there's other cases, he's working with other

18

officers here in state of Utah, that don't pertain

19

necessarily to this case and we're looking at the facts for

20

November 7, 2013 and what he was doing at that time.

21

think-

22

THE COURT:

Okay.

I

I will allow it as it relates to

23

the breadth - now, my understanding would, was when I made

24

the initial ruling that Officer Palmer would be a witness.

25

Now I'm advised at the next sidebar that he would not be a
147
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1

witness.

2

MR. JOHNSON:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. JOHNSON:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. JOHNSON:

7

8

His case is (inaudible) .
- sorry.

His case is Monday's case.

Yeah.
I noticed Agent Holmer up as a

witness for this hearing not Detective Palmer.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, then let's draw a line as

9

it relates to representations relative to the other case that

10

is going to be corning up on Monday and Tuesday in jury trial,

11

13 th and 14 th of April and draw the line there.

12

drawn that line had I known that officer or Deputy Palmer was

13

not-going to be called as a witness in this particular case.

14

Now, when he independently calls a federal officer

I would have

15

as it relates to potential for that officer to be involved in

16

this case and admitting that he may be useful in terms of

17

drug traffickers, then that is admissible, that's admissible.

18

He admits it.

19

and he was - so I think it's probative and - but we have to

20

be very cautionary in my estimation as it relates to the next

21

case and you probably have enough before the jury already

22

relative to that independent contact by this defendant

23

relative to the resolution of this case with a designation

24

that he is able to supply them with high level traffickers.

25

So let's - so -

He made the contact. He independently did that

i.,A
~
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2

MR. JOHNSON:

Okay, based on that ruling I ' l l wrap

it up ·and we'll -

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. JOHNSON:

5

THE COURT:

Yeah, wrap it up because I - I'll just have to accept that.
- think we need to use a great deal of

6

caution in my estimation, even though that's independently

7

done on the part of the defendant probably which would have

8

been against any recommendation or approval of his attorney

9

at that point in time.

10
11

Let's get the jury back in here and wrap it up.

MR. JOHNSON:

~

With respect to Detective Palmer's

involvement.
THE COURT:

14

Yeah,

I sustained the objection in part

15

as it relates to the breadth and as it relates to Deputy

16

Palmer.

Okay.

17

(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom)

18

THE COURT:

You may be seated.

We're back on the

19

record in the case of state of Utah vs. Michael Edgar,

20

No. 131403330.

21

seated and Mr. Johnson, you may continue with your

22

examination of Mr. Brandon Holmer.

25

Q

Case

Counsel and clients are present, the jury is

MR. JOHNSON:

23
24

So

I've sustained the objection, Mr. Stewart -

12
13

Okay.

Thank you, Your Honor.

(BY MR. JOHNSON) Agent Holmer, so after the

defendant talked to you about his ability to access pounds of
149
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1

heroin and a potential Mexican drug trafficker, did you

2

indicate that you would contact me at his direction?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

How were you suppose to get ahold of him after you

5

spoke to me?

6

A

I was provided with a cell phone number.

7

Q

By?

8

A

By Mr. Edgar.

9

Q

And after some time in talking with me did you call

10

that number back?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

And who did you speak with?

13

A

Spoke with who I identified as Mr. Edgars.

14

Q

Okay, and during that conversation did you indicate

15
16
17

that you would not be working with him?
A

That is correct,

I told him I would not be willing

to work with him.

18

Q

And is that the last you heard from him?

19

A

Yes.

20

MR. JOHNSON:

21

THE COURT:

22
23
24
25

Okay, that's all I have.

Thank you.

Cross examination?
CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. STEWART:
Q

So, when you get calls like this do you make

records of those calls?
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A

Depends on the situation.

2

Q

Did you in this case?

3

A

No,

4

Q

So there's no written record of this?

5

A

That's correct.

6

Q

And you keep referring to Mr. Edgars, do you know

7

I did not.

his name?

8

A

Michael Edgars, Michael John Edgars.

9

Q

With an 's' at the end?

10

A

He spoke his name over the phone.

11

to run him,

12

Q

So you didn't get his birth date?

13

A

No.

14

Q

Get his address?

15

A

No.

16

Q

Okay.

17
18

I didn't do any further background on him, so ...

And you've always known him as Michael

Edgars with an 's' at the end?
A

I believe so.

19

MR. STEWART:

20

THE COURT:

21

I had no reason

Okay, that's all I have.
You may step down.

Thank you Mr.

Holmer for being here.

22

Any reason why he ought not to be excused?

23

MR. JOHNSON:

24

25

If we could approach?

Yeah if we can

approach real quick.
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:
151
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
.
·· ~:~··:' · -~
Dated: January 28, 2016
Isl Lynn W.D~yJs}:.>, ;
03 :22:46 PM
Distrid-ro~rf Judge/
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EMILY ADAMS (14937)
ADAMS LEGAL LLC

PO Box 1564
Bountiful, UT 84011
Telephone: (801) 309-9625
Email: eadams@adamslegalllc.com

Attorney for Defendant!Appellant

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,

ORDER SUPPLEMENTING THE
RECORD

vs.
MICHAEL JOHN EDGAR,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Dist. Ct. No. 131403330
App. No. 20150605-CA
Judge Lynn Davis

This matter came before the Court for a hearing on January 12, 2016, on
request of the Court of Appeals to determine what happened at an unrecorded
pre-trial bench conference. Craig Johnson appeared on behalf of the State, and
Emily Adams appeared on behalf of Defendant Michael Edgar.
Based on the testimony received at the hearing, the Court makes the
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following findings of fact:
1. Mr. Edgar was charged by Information with, among other things,

possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.
2. The State amended the Information and charged Mr. Edgar with
possession with intent to distribute within a drug-free zone. The
State alleged in the Amended Information that Mr. Edgar committed
the crime within 1,000 feet of a ballet school.
3. The ballet school, however, was over 1,000 feet from where Mr.
Edgar was arrested.
4. The trial in this case occurred on April 9-10, 2015.
5. Around 8:30am on April 9, 2015, this Court, the prosecutor, and the
defense attorney held an in-chambers conference. That conference
was not recorded, although it was not the intent of the parties for the
conference to be an on-the-record type of hearing; it was more of a
conference where the attorneys touched base with the Court about
the upcoming trial.
6. The prosecutor brought to that conference a Second Amended

2
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Information, where, for the first time, Mr. Edgar was charged with
committing a crime within 1,000 feet of the "Ultimate Sports USA
Baseball and Softball Training Facility to the NW, making it a drugfree zone."
7. The prosecutor wanted the police case officer to testify about the
Ultimate Sports training facility, since he had measured its distance
from the defendant's arrest, but the defense attorney objected,
arguing that the officer's testimony lacked foundation. The Court
indicated that it would likely not allow the case officer's testimony
about the Ultimate Sports training facility, but that the State could
file the Second Amended Information if that State called the owner
or operator of the Ultimate Sports training facility to establish the
foundation for the new drug-free zone.
8. The prosecutor and case officer then located one of the owners of
one of the businesses located at the Ultimate Sports training facility
on the morning of April 9, 2015, and she agreed to appear at trial
later that day. The defense attorney did some Google research on the

3
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training facility briefly that morning.
9. As aforementioned, the prosecutor did ask permission from this
Court to file the Second Amended Information. The prosecutor
based the Second Amended Information on the information from
the police officer, and had he not had the testimony from the police
officer, he would not have asked for permission to file the Second
Amended Information. The Court granted permission to file the
Second Amended Information as long as the prosecutor could get
one of the owners to testify and as long as the defense attorney
could interview the owner during a break at trial.
10. The prosecutor and the defense attorney interviewed the owner for
the first and only time during a break in the trial proceedings on the
morning of April 8, 2015.
11. The owner did testify at trial and was cross-examined at trial.
12. As a result, the Court granted the State permission to file the Second
Amended Information, which the defendant was convicted of,
including the drug-free zone beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Approved as to form:
@

Isl Craig Johnson
Deputy Utah County Attorney
**ENTERED BY THE COURT ON THE DATE AS INDICATED BY THE COURT'S SEAL AT THE TOP OF THE

FIRST PAGE**
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 26, 2016, I efiled and therefore served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing on the following:
Jeffrey Buhman
Utah County Attorney
Gregory Stewart
/s/ Emily Adams
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